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Early in this century, however, Charles City was an important manufacturing center. Residents still boast that their town was the "birthplace of the farm tractor/' There, in 1901, the Hart-Parr Company produced the first commercially successful gasoline tractor, and the company dominated the North American tractor market for several years thereafter. By 1907, about one-third of all the tractors in the world were manufactured in Charles City. Hart-Parr tractors were powerful, long-lasting, fuel efficient, and technically innovative, and they sold well in both national and intemational markets.^ By the early 1910s, the HartParr Company was receiving considerable national attention for its innovative manufacturing processes, its management style, and the efficient and systematic engineering it employed in its plant and its products. On the surface, Hart-Parr's vision of the plant, work force, and marketplace seemed to exemplify the ideals that shaped American technology and business history in the early twentieth century.
The company's fortunes shifted drastically in the decade after 1913. After flawed business decisions during World War I devastated the firm's markets and reputation, stockholders brought in a new management team that rejected the earlier ethos of efficiency and engineering, embracing instead new strategies of production, marketing, and labor relations. Finally, in 1929, Hart-Parr joined the industrywide trend of mergers between tractor and implement manufacturers.
Mass production and scientific management are major themes in the history of early twentieth-century rrxanufacturing. Standard versions of American economic history emphasize the triumphant and inevitable emergence of centralized and efficient forms of production, management, and labor control. Fordism, as one component of the model was known, became identified with several irmovatioris, including the manufacture of large volumes of standardized products, the use of specialpurpose machine tools to fashion interchangeable parts, and the development of dynamic assembly processes. Following Alfred Chandler's lead, a generation of historians of American business has highlighted the organizational and managerial revolution that taught the business elite to govern large factories and vast corporations through a new class of middle managers willing and able to instill a corporate culture. In a parallel vein, labor historians have focused on managers' and manufacturers' expanding abilities to control the shop fioor work force through time management studies and innovations in training and compensation that fostered a "deskilling" of the labor force. In brief, the traditional view assumes that management and engineering merged around the tum of the century to form and solidify American industrial capitalism.* Recently, historians have begun to reevaluate the centrality of mass production in the history of manufacturing.^ Many States, 1880 -1920 (Madison, WI, 1975 Era, 1890 -1920 (Chicago, 1964 ; David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and tlie Rise of Corporate Capitalism (New York, 1979) ; and Alfred D. Chandler jr., Tlie Visible Hand: Vie Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA, 1977) .
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5. Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets, and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization, " Past & Present 108 (1985) , 13S-76; Philip Scranton, "Manufacturing Diversity: Production Systems, Markets, and an American Consumer Sodety, 1870 -1930 ," Technology and Culture 35 (1994 , 476-505; John K. Brown, The Baldwin Looemotive Works, 1830 A Study in American Industrial Practice manufacturers found the methods of mass production ill suited to their industries and markets, for mass production required substantial investments in equipment and engendered ter\se struggles to increase productivity, market share, and labor efficiency. Batch production^ whereby goods were made in small lots, offered manufacturers an alternative strategy that emphasized marketing, the ability to respond to market changes, and the negotiation of flexible working relationships with employees, subcontractors, and customers. The net result was that models of batch production and flexible production remained viable long after the heyday of Fordism. As this study shows, though Charles Hart hirnself claimed that he was "a great admirer of a certain automobile manufacturer," mass production was not, in the long term, well suited to tractor manufacturing in a small Iowa town.*T he history of "the Hart-Parr," as it was known in the local parlance, also helps us understand the emerging boundaries of corporate responsibility in the early twentieth-century United States. Recent studies of welfare capitalism have shown that such practices were rooted neither in generosity and altruism, as company histories imply, nor in the blatant forms of antiunionism and corporate hegemony that critics allege.'^ As the head of the dominant industry in a small Iowa town, Charles Hart was in a position to shape relations with his workers and the commuruty at large in several ways. Influenced by the Social Gospel, Hart surely had a sincere belief that he could play an important role in uplifting the working class. At the same time, however, he was in a position to directly benefit from the firm's welfare programs. (Baltimore, 1994) ; Stephen Meyer, "Technology and the Workplace: Skilled and Production Workers at Allis-Chalmers, 1900 -1941 ," Technology and Culture 29 (1988 Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865 (Princeton, NJ, 1997 Capitalism, 1880 -1940 (Chicago, 1976 ; H. M, Gitelman, "Welfare Capitalism Reconsidered," Labor History 33 (1992), 5-31; and Wilson J. Warren, "Evangelical Paternalism and Divided Workers: The Nonunion Era at John Morrell and Company in Ottumwa, 1877 ," Annals of ¡owa 56 (1997 Charles W. Hart, 1872 Hart, -1937 and Charles H. Parr, 1868 -1941 .
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BOTH CHARLES HART AND CHARLES PARR grew up in the rural Midwest, and both recognized from their teenage years that small engines, easy and economical to operate, had a great potential market among rural Americans.* Patents on the first successful internal combustion engine, invented by Nikolaus Otto in 1876, had expired by the early 1890s, creating 8. Available biographical materials include Jack Gilluly, "He Realized a Dream: The Story of C. W. Hart," unpublished manuscript, 1981, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, chaps. 2-6. The manuscript is paginated separately within each chapter, but individual chapters are not numbered. For ease of citation, I have created chapter numbers. Also, see C. H. Parr, "History of the Hart-Parr Company," in "Life of Charles Walter Hart," manuscript in vertical files, n.d., Floyd County Historical Society (hereafter FCHS), Charles City, Iowa; "Life of Charles Walter Hart" [ca. 1917] , copied from Iowa and Its Foremost Citizens, in vertical files, FCHS; and "Iowa's Great Tractor Factory," Iozm Factories 1 (May 1912), 10-17. An early trade catalog indicates that Hart and Parr predicted an extensive market for power machinery: The "day is not far distant when every blacksmith shop, elevator, restaurant, creamery, country residence, feed mill, isolated electric lighting plant, bakery, laundry, butcher shop or shop of any kind will be provided with an internal combustion engine for power." The Hart-Parr Company, "Gasolene [sic] Engines" (Madison, WI, [ca. 1900] ), in vertical files, FCHS. a flurry of interest in the machine.' Charles Hart first studied engineering at Iowa State CoUege before transferring to the University of Wisconsin, where he met Wisconsin-bom Charles Parr at the registration tables. As part of their senior honors thesis in mechanical engineering, the two men produced five working intemal combustion engines. By the time they graduated in 1896, they had formed the Hart and Parr Company of Madison.'" Although his degree was in engineering. Hart later declared that his tenure at the Elliott Business College in Burlington, Iowa, had a greater impact on his career. There, the curriculum stressed student role-playing in virtually all of the office tasks useful for the emerging class of white-collar managers." In 1901 the company accepted an offer of bank loans, land grants, and tax breaks to move operations to a three-hundredsquare-foot building in Charles City, near the Floyd County farm where Hart had grown up.'^ Soon after this relocation, the sales success of Hart-Parr tractors persuaded the company to drop its line of stationary engines and to expand tractor manufacturing operations. By that time, Charles Hart had gained control of the firm's management; Charles Parr was no longer a central participant in company operations." 9. C. H. Wendel, American Gasoline Engines since 1872 (Sarasota, FL, 1983) . 10. C. W. Hart and C. H. Parr, "Intemal Combustion Engines," Wisconsin n eer I (1896-97), 192-203, 338-44, 452-57, 599-604, and ibid. 2 (1897) , 43-50. Their thesis contair\s a survey of the history of intemal combustion engines. 11. Information on the curriculum from Twenty-Seventh Annual Catalogue: Elliott's Business CoUege and Elliott's School of Shorthand (Burlington, IA, 1905) .
I would Uke to thank Joanne Guest of the Burlington Public Library for supplying the photocopies. Hart's comment on the value of his Burlington education is from Gilluly, "He Realized a Dream," chap. 39, p. 3. 12. C. H. Parr, "History of the Hart-Parr Company." 13. Charles Parr's history of the firm does not reveal the reason for his relatively minor role in company management, and betrays no bittemess over the situation. A 1908 article described him as the "night watchman." When he and Hart were oiasted from the board in the 1917 management change. Parr remained on the staff as head of the Engineering Department. Parr also served on the school board for several terms beginning in 1913. Charles City Daily Intelligencer (hereafter CCDJ), 15 October 1908 , 6 and 11 March 1913 , and 7 June 1917 Charles City Daily Press (hereafter CCDP) As employment grew from 15 in 1901 to about 1,800 in 1917, the firm reshaped the physical and social character of Charles City." The huge plant dominated the northem edge of the city, overtaking twenty-four acres of farmland and stockyards to create a noisy and smoky landscape of factory buildings, fuel tanks, company-owned railroad tracks, and vast piles of sand, coal, ash, and iron dust.'"^ Beyond the factory complex, commuter rail lines, tenement housing, working-class cafes, and the neighborhoods of a new managerial class extended into lands that the company purchased from retiring farmers. Hart-Parr's influence reached still farther beyond Charles City's boundaries: it connected fanners on the midwestem and Great Plains prairies with the urban industrial economy; it brought the machinery and capital of eastem industrialists and financiers to the rural Midwest; it established ties with agents who promoted the company from outposts in Canada, Europe, South America, and Africa; and it attracted to Charles City hundreds and then thousands of skilled and unskilled workers from rural Iowa, the Midwest, eastem Europe, and elsewhere seeking employment with the company^* 14. Employment data from Cameron W. Hanson and Heather M. Hull, eds.. Past Harvests: A Floyd County History to 1996 (Charles City, 1996) , 103; Iowa Bureau of Labor Statistics, Twelfth Biennial Report, 1905 (Des Moines, 1907 idem. Thirteenth Biennial Report, 1906 -1907 (Des Moines, 1908 idem. Fourteenth Biennial Report, Í908-1909 (Des Moines, 1910 and Charles City Press and Evening Intelligencer (hereafter CCPET) (Iowa City, 1993), 1-11; and Daniel Nelson, Farm and Factory: Workers in the Midwest, 1880 -1990 (Bloomington, IN, 1995 In 1907 the firm began a tremendous expansion of its industrial space. Hart envisioned the factory as an organic machine, and seized the opportunity to implement his strategies of industrial engineering and factory management through the plant's architecture, infrastructure, layout of the grounds, and selection and arrangement of the machinery. With the permission of the city council, the firm relocated railroad tracks, blocked off city streets, and appropriated the formerly public land as company property. Beneath the streets lay the plaint's circulatory system, a 1,200-foot network of concrete tunnels that carded wires for electricity and telephone, and pipes for water and sewage.'^ The buildings incorporated innovations in design and in their use of materials, particularly through Hart's enthusiastic support for reinforced concrete as a building material. Concrete buildings were not only appropriate for bearing the weight of hundreds of machine tools and tons of raw rxxaterials; they also served a tiers were able to obtain farmland. To a large degree, those seeking jobs in that era had to tum to the state's urban areas and factory towns. Grace M. Zorbaugh, "Farm Background of Country Migrants to Iowa Industries," ¡owa managerial function. By offering more open spaces, they provided better sight lines for managerial supervision, better lighting, and greater stability for workers operating heavy machines. Hart also examined the ventilation system, recognizing that modifications in the work envirorunent affected workers' productivity. Reports make clear that efficiency, rather than worker comfort, was the principal goal."
Charles Hart aggressively tried to bring an industrial and engineering mentality to Charles City. Not surprisingly, the local media were willing allies. Hart wrote a weekly column for the Charles City Daily Intelligencer, using his space to publicize positive developments at "the Hart-Parr." The newspaper's editor participated by urging all citizens to thank Hart-Parr for its contributions to the city and for its leniency with employees during hard times. During the plant's expar\sion phase, the newspaper promised that it was "worth a fifty-mile joumey" simply to see the crane that hovered over the site, and encouraged readers to purchase a ticket on the platform to observe the construction.'' Local newspapers also opposed labor activism, pollution controls, and anything else that might threaten corporate interests; one operüy admitted that it had no intention of publishing news about layoffs or sales slumps.^ The local media's most consistent theme was to encourage local real estate agents and landlords to create ever more housing for the HartParr work force. The persistence of such calls, however, suggests that many understood that as Hart-Parr's labor force fluctuated, any investment in housing for rural Iowa's industrial workers carried some risk.
18. Before 1907, parts of the buildings were exposed to Iowa's extreme winters, prompting the local newspaper to report that workers were "quite jubilant over the anticipation of a more tropical climate." To ameliorate conditions in the summer months, Hart designed a system for spraying a mist of water through giant fans. Hart took a personal interest in sales and believed that his customers should embrace his enthusiasm for engineering and expertise. He considered it a duty to teach farmers to think of the gasoline tractor as "the true secret of power efficiency in agriculture," and stressed that time savings, rather than profits, offered the tractor's main advantage over the horse. As one manager wrote in an article titled "Educating the Consumer to Use Tractors," the fanner who used a tractor anything less than one hundred days per year "detracts fix)m [its] efficiency." In its print advertisings featuring themes of power, efficiency, and quality, the firm aimed to convince farmers to embrace "power fanning." Some advertisements devoted as many column inches to describing and illustrating the factory as the tractor. In effect, the firm hoped to convince fanners that simply owning a Hart-Parr tractor would impart important values of engineering and efficiency by linking tiiem with the perfection of Charles City's manufacturing process.^'
The company also brought its message directly onto the farm. By 1908, for every eight tractors it sold, Hart-Parr employed one so-called "expert" to advise customers on how to make repairs and maximize productivity. In 1911 the firm introduced another innovation, the Hart-Pan School of Traction Farming and Traction Engineering, a series of lessons available via correspondence for potential customers and farmers who had purchased a Hart-Pan machine. Students were instructed to "study systematically and carefully.... do it with system do not let pleasure or other work interfere with your study hours if you can possibly avoid it." Each of the fifteen lessons included a quiz that students sent in to Charles City to be graded by staff members. Those who scored below 70 percent on any quiz were expected to try again. Whatever success this program may have had, farmers still had a difficult mechanical task in front of them: the 1912 Hart-Parr model, for instance. included nineteen instructions just to start the engine and twelve to stop it.Ĥ art-Parr's manufacturing ethos also extended to its network of dealers and white-collar employees. Dealer conventions typically began with day-long tours of the plant and thorough lessons on the engineering ideas that lay behind specific machining operations. Meals featured dishes inspired by the factory tour, with menu items such as "Ball Bearings with Cup Grease" as the vegetable and "Graham Bread Baked by Gasoline Heat." Festivities also included role-playing; at a time when the firm was trying to drum up enthusiasm for a new line of small tractors known as the Little Devil, dealers took on roles as members of the Little Devil Order under the authority of a Hart-Parr manager posing as "His High and Sataruc Majesty."" In 1916 Hart laid off several branch managers and tumed to more "outside experts" to make sales calls. In the interest of streamlining this effort, the firm purchased a block of homes in Charles City to house the typists and stenographers who sent a programmatic series of six letters to prospective customers. The whole system, far more impersonal than other firms' sales strategies, was not successful.^"* HART-PARR'S OPERATIONS had important ramifications for the demography and social history of Charles City. The company's continual demand for industrial workers fostered the spread of the manufacturing mentality in northem Iowa. A company booklet titled "Men Wanted" boasted that the firm's commitment to system and efficiency in the manufacturing process meant that it did not need to take advantage of its employees because it could be particular in selecting its work force. According to the booklet, the company wanted "only such employees as will be interested in increasing to the highest plane, the health, beauty, temperance, morality, and general good of the place." In particular, labor recruiters sought "yotmg married men who show by work and reputation that they are industrious, saving, temperate, and of high moral character."T hey also welcomed "good, bright, farmer boys," ministers seeking supplemental income, and Iowa State College engineering students inteming during the surruner.^*^ These purported goals notwithstanding, the company also hired a large number of immigrants, including natives of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia, Italy, Mexico, and one worker from India. The most sigrüficant addition to Charles City's demography was a contingent of nearly one hundred Serbians, most of whom were natives of a small comer of Herzegovina in the Habsburg Empire."
At Hart-Parr, housing the work force became an important element in a strategy of corporate hegemony. Insisting that "the class of men desired should not be satisfied to live in rented 25. Hart-Parr Company, "Men Wanted," [1909], FCHS; CCDI, 23 July 1909 . 26. CCDI, 3 August 1907 CCPEI, 13 June 1916 and 23 April 1919. 27 . Immigration data based on a database of 1,129 employees, obtained through a study of the Records of the Selective Service System, 1917 -1918 , National Archives, Southeast Branch; United States Bureau of the Census, Census of 1920, and nev/spaper sources. Hart-Parr employed a total of about 130 foreign-bom workers in 1917 and 1920. Most of those from Germany and Scandinavia had arrived in Floyd County before Hart-Parr opened, whereas most of those from southern and eastern Europe arrived after 1905, and may have come to Charles City specifically to work at the plant. In the early twentieth century, nearly all Serb immigrants to the United States came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, not from Serbia. As a result, census and Selective Service enumerators often labeled them as Austrians; at times, my analysis reflects a guess of who was Serbian, based on last name, housing pattems, and/or town of origin. Serbs from the Herzegovina region often emigrated due to declining soil fertility in their region, as well as political pressures within the Habsburg Empire. See Branko Mita Colakovic, Yugoslav Migrations to America (San Francisco, 1973), 21-62. homes," the company opened its own real estate office as part of the plant expansion in 1907. Hart-Parr also irütiated its own home-building program. By 1913, the company controlled nearly four hundred home lots and offered to finance employees' homes at 6 percent interest over a six-year mortgage, payable through payroll deductior\s.^ The company's rhetoric and policies with regard to housing may have appealed to the nativebom homeowners who formed the core of the Hart-Parr work force, but many workers still found their housing in the YMCA, tenement apartments, or the all-concrete apartment complex known as "The DeWop Hotel" that the firm constructed across the tracks from the plant.Ê arly twentieth-century business leaders recognized that controlling workers' time was a more prudent strategy than negotiating with them on wages and benefits. Control of workers' leisure time enhanced a company's influence over its employees while simultaneously reir\forcing workers' notioi\s of masculinity and domestic hegemony.*' Insisting that the dty needed "amusements . . . get-at- City "Y" the largest in the nation for a town its size. With programs and sixty-eight rooms clearly designed for company employees, the facility gained a reputation as a "Hart-Parr club." The YMCA candidly revealed its efforts at social engineering in classes that focused on physical training and business and leadership skills. "Working boys" received special attention; instructors boasted that "every boy in the class has been taught the value of discipline and made to respect authority" and that "smoking, swearing, smut, etc. are fast disappearing." For its part, the company pressured its employees to contribute to the YMCA fund and permitted ministers from the YMCA to offer lunchtime sermons for workers in the factory, particularly during times of potential labor unrest."
The "Tractor Inn" in downtown Charles City represented another component of the company's paternalistic program for its employees. A club open to Hart-Parr employees, provided they were of "good character/' this three-story facility featured dormitory rooms for transient employees, billiard tables, a cafeteria, and an auditorium for speakers, debates, dances, and mock trials. The Tractor Inn also provided gym equipment and hosted weekly wrestling and boxing matches between HartParr employees and itinerant challengers, permitting workers to vent their aggressiveness against punching bags and out-oftowners rather than management. The complex offered programs for employees' children, too; ceremonies were held to initiate the so-called Unfinished Iron Castings into the mysteries of the "Uttle Devil Order.""" Hart-Parr was not above using intimidation to achieve its goals. Discipline on the factory floor was enforced by Hart himself. When he walked down the line, even a worker who was related to Hart knew not to say hello. The same employee recalled that after the plant converted to wartime production, a husky man armed wiüi a pistol strolled the line to ensure discipline and deter espionage.
Most of the company's policies, however, were couched in language designed to persuade workers to embrace its corporate culture. Consider the company's holiday and vacation policies, for example. Employees were encouraged to take one to two weeks of unpaid vacation each year, but only four holidays -also impaid-^were approved because the company believed "that nation is most degenerate which has the most holidays." Periodically, the company announced sudden "vacations"-unexpected reductions in the hourly workers' schedule, justified in terms of allowing workers to get extra sleep, to spend more time with their families, or to "get closer to nature."L ike other industrial concems interested in maximizing productivity, Hart-Pan used benefit programs to secure employees' loyalty The Hart-Pan Relief Organization, for ir\stance, offered long-term employee benefits in the case of accident or sickness. Funded through payroll deductions, with the company contributing orüy the admirüstrative costs, the plan, like similar programs elsewhere in the country, promised specified benefitsthree times one's weekly salary for the loss of a finger, fifty times one's salary for the loss of one foot and one hand, and so on-^provided that the injxiries were not attributed to "improper or immoral conduct, or ... the use of intoxicating liquors." The program also limited the company's liability in the case of serious accident. ' .) ; "Employees'-miscellaneous," vertical files, FCHS. Although it generated considerable publicity, it is unlikely that many workers joined the plan, and the company eventually dropped this benefit, perhaps during World War I. In 1919, 285 Hart-Parr employees (41 percent) were members of fratemal orgarúzations,' which used accident and life insurance as one of their main selling points.
Many Hart-Parr workers learned to embrace the ethos of industrialism even as they endured a loud, dirty, and noxious work environment. Workers purportedly accepted these dangers as the price of their job, and were likely to boast of chewing tobacco dipped in cylinder oil or working with greasy hands as a "badge of honor."" Nonetheless, about twenty workers suffered injuries each day. Although most accidents resulted in minor cuts, scrapes, or bits of emery or steel in the eyes, newspaper notices were full of cases of serious workplace injuries: Jesse Smith's skull was crushed when a pin on a hydraulic press broke; John Yancey's skin came off his body "in shreds" after a naphtha explosion; Joe Miller had a leg amputated after it w^as crushed by a falling steel beam; and E B. Tubbs was badly burned when a coworker tossed a match into the pail of gasoline in which Tubbs was washing his hands. Yet workplace safety did not emerge as a serious issue during the Hart-Parr era, and the firm was able to defuse public concerns by initiating safety campaigns and establishing its own clinic with a nurse employed full-time at the plant site after 1919.^P erhaps one Charles City family symbolizes the hardships and opporturüties that Hart-Parr, like other American industrial concerns, offered in the early twentieth century. Luka ("Louis") Micich, a native of "Austrian" Herzegovina, came to the United States in about 1903; his wife, whom he met for the first time on the docks of New York City through an arranged marriage, arrived a few years later. After a stint in the wire-making industry Study (New York, 1923) in DeKalb, Illinois, the Micich family came to Charles City as operations expanded during World War I. Micich worked intermittently for twenty-two years under the harsh conditions of the Hart-Parr (and, later, Oliver) foundry and shop floor, before succumbing to silicosis and dying in 1941. Circumstances improved for the next generation, however. Bom in one of HartParr's tiny cement homes at the hands of a Serbian midwife, the family's children stayed in Charles City through the rise and fall of the plant; local union support enabled one son, Mike Micich, to be elected mayor of Charles City in 1952.^' CHARLES HART'S SYSTEM of rewards and punishments was designed to mold a work force committed to the company's goals. Health benefits to long-term workers fostered a gendered attitude of employees' responsibility to remain the family breadwinner. The promotion of housing facilities for both long-term and transient employees prepared the company for fluctuations in labor demands. The encouragement of athletics and other entertainment circixmscribed workers' choices in the orüy hours of the day left to their own discretion. And the attention that HartParr's welfare programs generated played a significant role in establishing a positive image for the firm and for the community. But oüier aspects of Hart-Parr's manufacturing processes also attracted attention from the nation's industrial and management press in the years before World War I.
The comments of one business journalist typified the general admiration of the firm's efficiency, lauding the firm's "smooth machinelike action" and its "neat and harmonious plant," and describing Hart-Parr's "greatest efficiency [as its] true knowledge of costs and business upon the surest and safest lines."*' The company's claim that "the matter of interchange- 
The factory assembly area in the Charles City Hart-Parr plant, c. 1915. Photo courtesy FCHS.
ability is a very live question" also attracted attention, as the company boasted that virtually all tractor parts were fashioned at the Hart-Parr plant. Like Ford, Hart designed several of his own "ingeruous" special machine tools, most driven by individual electric motors, permitting the flexible and rational arrangement of men and machines.'" Hart-Parr's admirers also commented on the efficient telephone and communication systerr\s. Since many of the employees who hauled materials throughout the plant were "illiterate" immigrants, the company designed a numerical code to deliver ir\structions. Reportedly, "even the dullest" truckers could do their jobs with few mistakes. The large planning board that governed the use of ma- chine tools also impressed observers. Using a complicated system of colored wooden blocks, each color designating a specific machine tool and the length of each block designating the length of time that the job required, plarmers could schedule well in advance the optimal use of each machine tool." A similar technique using colored tacks permitted managers to observe the status and supply of each part needed for final assembly on the erecting floor without the "difficult and tiresome" method of "turning the pages of old-fashioned records."*^ Business writers also respected Hart's shrewdness in founding the Charles City Westem Railway, an interurban line that both linked the plant with additional competitors for its freight business and served as an important commuter line for Hart-Parr employees."
The plant's electricity generating system was perhaps the most impressive and ominous indication of Hart's enthusiasm for mechanization. As part of its advertised promise that HartParr tested each tractor engine before it left the plant, workers attached each engine for twenty to forty hours to one of ten direct-current electric generators that provided the plant's needed power. These continuously filled the work space ir\side the plant with the smell, noise, and smoke of ten operating internal combustion engines, prompting one writer to comment that the "majestic roar of Niagara is low music" in comparison. 
The tractor testing line at the Hart-Parr plant, c. 1915. Photo courtesy
Supposedly, Hart himself examined each test result before approving the painting, final assembly, and shipment.'*'Ô utside observers also praised Hart's strategies of shop fioor management. Reflecting a commitment to efficient production strategies taught in engineering school, as well as lessons in systematic management taught at the Burlington business school, Hart-Pan had procedures and paperwork that morütored virtually every step of shop practice. The payment system, for example, differed from the piece-rate system common at other plants, since tasks were rated according to the total cost budgeted rather than total time. Eoremen recorded each machinist's work on a form and compared the productivity with that of the company norm. Under this "modified day work 45. Wooley, "Secrets of Business Success," 347; "Efficiency Management in a Gas Tractor Plant," 49-60; Porter, "Players in the Great Game: Charles W. Hart," 408-10; "Iowa's Great Tractor Factory," 16. system/' workers who regularly beat the rated cost received increased pay. This provided incentive and immediate rewards, "without the petty tyranny of foremen that sometimes dominates shop floors." Such principles taught foremen to measure employees' productivity against rigid standards of efficiency rather than ones that permitted flexibility or negotiation. In this era, Hart-Parr was admired for a system in which "the personal question does not enter into the question of the man's advancement; he is judged entirely by his actual record."** HART-PARR'S IMPRESSIVE STATURE both locally and nationally declined considerably after 1914 due to a series of poor decisions and unfortunate breaks. First, World War I hostilities devastated the company's foreign markets.*'^ In response to declining tractor sales, the company looked to munitions contracts as an alternative. Hart spent several months in the eastern Urüted States and Canada studying other shops and munitions projects before presenting J. P. Morgan and Company with a $1.5 rrullion bid to manufacture 9.2-inch artillery shells for the British govemment. Morgan's agents were reportedly impressed with Hart's "large knowledge of manufacturing methods, shop management and efficiency," and Hart-Parr beat out one hundred firms to receive a contract in October 1915.** Yet this triumph of Hart-Parr's reputation in manufacturing and engineering did not ensure future success. To fulfill the contract, the company converted the tractor plant into an arms factory. Convinced that the machinery necessary for the shell project did not exist on the market. Hart designed a unique 1,200-ton-capacity forge press and dozens of precision specialpurpose lathes. The project also required new drill presses, a new steel foundry, and a new ventilation system, and demanded that the factory become one of the largest copper casting fa- 
One of the automatic lathes specially designed in Charles City for the manufacture of World War One artillery shells. Photo courtesy FCHS.
cilities in the country. These short-term changes cost the firm more than a half-million dollars. Wartime circumstances also increased pressure on the local labor supply, and workers had some difficulty meeting the precision standards that the British goverrunent demanded.*'
In another response to declirüng markets and competition in the marketplace, Hart-Parr reversed its traditional emphasis on heavy, powerful machinery built for the large farms of the Great Plains by reluctantly entering the small tractor market in 1915. By that time, many American tractor manufacturers, most notably Henry Ford, had recognized that wartime pressures on food and labor markets had created a large demand for tractors suitable for smaller farms in the East and Midwest. The "Little Devil" was Hart-Parr's entry in the field. According to a com-pany historian, the Little Devil's design "was simplicity itself," but it was brought to the market without adequate testing. Due to its sensitivity to variations in temperature and humidity, the machine did not operate reliably. Its poor balance was especially problematic, and at times the front wheels lifted entirely off the ground while the back wheels buried themselves deeper into the soil. The company's initial solution was to add two hundred pounds of cement to weigh down the front wheels, but that compromised steering. Moreover, its marketing strategy failed. Hart-Parr used a "mystery advertising" approach, printing up thousands of postcards with nothing on them but "THE LITTLE DEVIL IS COMING" in red type. The mailing had no retum address, and the postmark did not reveal the city. The strategy successfully generated attention, but it sometimes was misinterpreted. For instance, one Mar^itoba customer, separated from his wife, saw the cards as a veiled threat of revenge from his wife's family and returned to his wife. Hart himself did not seem to believe in the product. Even as the firm was promoting its "Little Devil," Hart publicly challenged the whole concept of small tractors. He predicted that the future belonged to the one-hundred-horsepower models, and urged farmers to delay buying a tractor until they could purchase a machine able to "apply the greatest power to each acre." By 1917, Hart-Parr had dropped the whole line. Although the company paid out liberal allowances to buy models back from owners, the episode dramatically damaged the company's . ,. so reputation.
Matters came to a head during the winter of 1916-17. By that time, Charles Hart's relationship with many prorrünent dtizens in Charles City had decayed. Some of his actions created anxiety and mounting pressure for change. In a speech celebrating the opening of the Tractor Inn, for instance. Hart charged that the dty council was "entirely incapable" of wise and enterprising government. "Our company, as usual," he said, "has had to do directly that which the town enterprise had neither the foresight or [sic] the courage to undertake." In those tense times, Charles City banker A. E. Ellis, growing increasingly frustrated with the firm's demand for capital, visited the plant almost daily. Holding $1.5 million in promissory notes, and with the threat of a depositors' run on the barüc in the air, Hart-Parr's financial backers met behind closed curtains in the Ellis home to seek a solution. Even more ominous, the British government canceled its order in March 1917, just as production reached full capacity. With 90 percent of the plant devoted to wartime production, the cancellation prompted the firm's financiers to manipulate proxy voting, allowing a group of stockholders from Chicago and Philadelphia to seize control of the company. Following a May 1917 board meeting, the firm announced Charles Hart's resignation. Walter Dray, a 28-yearold MIT-trained manager, took over daily operations. That day, the Tractor Ir\n closed its doors, with residents evicted the next moming. Within weeks, virtually all of the old management at Hart-Parr had announced their resignations."
The local newspaper welcomed the changing of the guard, suggesting that Hart desperately needed "a rest," and hoping that the new management would make the plant "more than a thing of iron and steel."^^ Yet the newly configured Hart-Parr Company faced a difficult transition period. Upon the congres- sional declaration of war in 1917, Hart-Pan gained several munitions contracts with the United States govemment. The company produced a number of "anti-kaiser devices," including steering and hoisting engines, steel wheels for military trucks, and navy gun mounts.^ Still, there were additional hurdles. Unfortunately, the American military requested 9.5-inch shells; the lathes built for Britain's 9.2-inch shells could not be converted without tremendous cost.^^ Curiously, fifty of those lathes were destroyed in a two-hundred-thousand-doUar fire just weeks after the American govemment rejected the firm's efforts to secure a contract to produce 9,5-inch shells. Hart-Pan was insured.T HE TWO YEARS following the armistice were among the most significant in the firm's early history. Sales soared during the brief postwar agricultural boom, requiring a rapid expansion of the w^ork force. Hart-Pan did not escape the widespread labor militancy in postwar America, however. In February and March 1919, thirty-five machinists and helpers presented the company with demands for increased wages and attempted to form a union associated with the Intemational Association of Machinists. Managers promptly fired all thirty-five, replaced them with returning veterans, and refused to reinstate them even when pressured to do so by representatives from the Department ^5
The episode provoked Hart-Parr to respond with a number of changes. On ¿le very day that the labor issue hit the newspaper, the company initiated a series of informal, after-hours "smokers" with employees, meetings that may have had no real purpose other than to permit workers to vent their grievances and to hear management's views. New corporate welfare programs also began, including a renewed emphasis on safety issues, new home-building projects, the operung of the Hart-Parr dispensary, and the end of the Saturday afternoon shift, offering workers Üie benefit of free bus service to the VWldwood golf course.^* A second stockholders' revolt occurred in December 1919, when local investors purchased the controlling stock. A new management team led by Charles City banker C. D. EllisHart's original financier-and his son Melvin W. Ellis took control of the firm; Walter Dray suddenly resigned as general manager. The new board quickly brought another round of changes to Hart-Parr operations. They purchased Charles Hart's remaining shares in both Hart-Parr and the Charles City Westem Railway, declared the firm's first dividends since 1914, and created a new profit-sharing plan for salaried employees who had been with the firm for at least two years. The eligibility requirement in effect redefined what made a worker a successful breadwinner: longevity gained precedence over mechanical skill. Inside the plant, engineers replaced the loud and smoky tractor testing method with a new system that shifted inspection duties to foremen working the day shift. The new managers also announced that field "experts" would no longer perform routine service calls for customers; instead, the company began to emphasize its arrangements with tractor schools that would replace correspondence courses and train farmers to conduct their own repairs. The title of the company's in-house magazine also reflected the new approach: the new magazine, Hart-Parrtners, replaced the joumal Field and Factory eral Mediation and Conciliation Service, National Archives II, College Park, MD; CCPEI, 6 March 1919. Labor issues are also discussed in CCPEI, 24 and 28 February, 1,3,5, and 18 March, and 28 April 1919. 58. CCPEI, 8 and 10 April and 3 May 1919. produced under Hart's tenure.^" A new column in the local newspaper that featured brief biographies of enaployeesmainly managers and foremen-further seemed to signal a departure from the previous emphasis on labor management and control. Similarly, a new commitment to family-oriented company picnics replaced the masculinity and individualism of the company entertairunent that had prevailed during Hart's tenure.** In general, these initiatives suggest that the new management team replaced the ethos of efficiency and engineering with a new emphasis on building relationships with whitecollar employees, dealers, and customers.
Despite " ibid. 40 (1919), 895-901, 930, and 960-66; and John H. Van Deventer, "Ford Principles and Practice at River Rouge," part 11, "Machining Tractor Parts and Assembling Ford Tractors," Industrial Management 56 Ouly 1923), 19-27. nately for Hart-Parr, its tractors no longer served the typical tractor customer; its heavy and powerful machine, suitable for virgin soils in the wheat belt, was inappropriate for the row crops of smaller farmers in the Midwest. The cumulative problems meant that Hart-Parr sales fell 90 percent between 1920 and 1924." Declining sales demanded new marketing strategies and a more flexible approach to manufacturing. In rather desperate attempts to compete with Fordson's low prices, Hart-Parr slashed tractor prices, guaranteed customers a refund in case of price reductions, and promised to underwrite loans that local banks made to Hart-Parr customers." After weeks of satirizing rumors of an impending plant shutdown, the factory did indeed close in October for an "inventory" that, for many employees, lasted forever. In the midst of these crises, the company sponsored a "hard-timers'" party on Halloween-with no white-collar workers permitted-a somewhat duplicitous response to workers' frustrations." Production records reveal that the company deliberately depleted inventories and abandoned any remnant of the old strategy of high-volume production. Instead, the firm shifted to batch production, manufacturing goods in small lots in response to specific customer orders. In the two fiscal years spanning November 1921 to November 1923, there were forty-four weeks in which the company manufactured no thirty-horsepower tractors-HartParr's best-selling model.*^ The factory began to accept orders on a custom basis. Then, in the late 1920s, the company embarked on another variation in manufacturing by alternating three weeks of producing its most popular models with one 62. The decline in sales is reported in an unpublished Hart-Parr sales manual [ca. 1928] , folder 83, box 85, Higgins Collection. As sales collapsed during the agricultural depression of the early 1920s, the company slashed prices 38 to 43 percent on the main models. "Reduces Tractor Prices," Farm Implement News 43 (8 June 1922), 9. 63. CCP, 29 September and 2 October 1920; TAWN, 6 June 1922 . 64. CCP, 18 and 28 October and 5 November 1920 , 30 December 1921 . The twenty-horsepower tractor fared even worse; in 38 weeks of the fiscal year 1921-22 and 25 weeks of fiscal year 1922-23, the plant produced not one H-P 20. 1921-22 and 1922-23 ProducHon Records, R. C. Rolfing Collection, FCHS. Another plant shutdown is mentioned in CCDN, 5 November 1920. week of manufacturing its less popular model.** The firm's new emphasis on outsourcing work for the tractor's component parts points to another sharp contrast with the past. Whereas promoters in the 1910s stressed the quality of HartParr engineering, boasting that virtually all component parts were manufactured in Charles City, advertisements of the 1920s often stressed the quality and name-brand reputation of its suppliers." Unable to compete successfully with Ford and Fordism, Hart-Parr recast its approach to manufacturing and marketing.
The firm's renewed commitment to advertising and sales also suggests that Hart-Parr was looking for a niche as a batch rather than a mass producer. Dave Darrah, manager of sales promotion, complained that previous tractor sales campaigns put excessive emphasis on horsepower, engineering, and the particular qualities of specific machines and brands. Darrah's approach was to introduce dealers to the Hart-Parr "system of sales."** Recogrüzing that many farmers remained convinced that horse teams offered advantages in terms of cost and manure production, Darrah's strategy was to sell the tractor idea in general. In the new marketing scheme, old definitions of expertise were turned on their head: for example, one advertisement depicted a farmer instructing a Hart-ParT engineer how to design a tractor. Marketers continued to mention the power of Hart-Parr tractors, but placed a new emphasis on their lighter weight, ease of operation, and the sheet metal that completely enclosed the motor and hid it from view.^ Hart-Parr also emphasized its tractors' compatibility with implements produced by other firms, and Darrah urged a cooperative approach to farm machinery advertising through industry associations such as the National Institute of Power Farming.™ As one Hart-Parr consultant frarJdy put it, tractor manufacturers needed to recognize that "salability," rather than the quality of the product, was the key to overcoming farmers' reluctance/' The company's relationship with its sales force also changed significantly in Ü\e 1920s. Shifting from a system of agents who contacted the company with news of prospects, the new system relied on dealers committed to the Hart-Parr brand. Salesmen were taught that the firm's founders were "two farmer boys"-• overlooking their engineering talents and training-and that Hart-Parr tractors "are built for the man who is going to use them-^not for the 'book learned' engineer."T he evolution of the company logo further illustrates HartParr's metamorphosis. enthusiastic embrace of a new strategy of diversification." Listing the firm's complete line of "kerosene tractors, stationary engines, feed mills, washing machines, air compressors, and commercial castings," the slogan correlated with President Melvin EUis's admission that wartime murùdor^ work had led to indebtedness, and that the company's experiment with the Little Devil tractor had been "a horrible failure."" While the efforts to make Charles City "the grey iron and semi-steel casting center of Iowa" benefited the company over the long term, the strategy to reintroduce stationary engines and add lines of air compressors, feed grinders, and washing machines did not succeed in markets that were just as competitive as the tractor sector.
These maneuvers notwithstanding, the company rebounded only when the agricultural economy recovered modestly in the mid-1920s. In 1925, the company recorded dramatic sales increases that impressed agricultural implement dealers around the Midwest. After years of "sales resistance," Hart-Parr dealers in Illinois sold 150 tractors in the dead of winter 1924-25.'^ A "Prosperity Special" train loaded with $250,000 in cargo sparked parades, dinners, and other festivities across Iowa and Illinois. Notably, the acclaim focused on the salesmen-the "hustlers"-who secured the orders, not the engineers who designed the tractors nor the workers who built them. Indeed, articles attributed the campaign's success to dealers' abilities to sell a tractor for the farmer's farm, "rather than for the glorification of the engineers."" In contrast, one sales campaign initiated during Hart's tenure had explicitly chastised tractor firms that relied on "fine salesmanship" rather than the product.^Â s the market for farm machinery improved further in the later 1920s and "Prosperity Specials" continued to roll out of Charles City, Hart-Parr's sales grew steadily from 1925 to 1928." Yet the firm could not ignore trends in the farm tractor and farm machinery business. Soon after 1922, when the Intemational Harvester Farmall tractor introduced its efficient power take-off system, it became almost imperative for tractor firms to merge with companies that manufactured compatible plows, harrows, and other farm implements. Consequently, on April 1, 1929, Hart-Parr joined three other firms to form the Oliver Farm Equipment Company of Chicago.'^Thus ended the independent life of tractor manufacturing in Charles City. The plant continued to produce tractors, tractor parts, and castings into the 1990s, but it never again played a dominant role in the industry. THE HISTORY OF "THE HART-PARR" reflects several trends in the history of American manufacturing and management. As an aspiring mass producer of farm tractors, Charles Hart em- ployed principles used in other industries-engineering, systemization, rationalization, efficiency, and labor control-to help build Hart-Parr into one of the largest industrial firms in Iowa and one of the dominant players in the American tractor industry. Hart adopted the ideals of factory design, mass production, and scientific management that provided the basis for several successful American industries. Those ideals also had a profound impact on the economy and society of Charles City, as Hart and his colleagues tried to persuade the town's residents to accept those broader national trends.
Yet Hart's principles could not be sustained. Tractor producers lacked sufficient market presence to employ strategies of bulk and mass production, and tractors were simply too large and too heavy to be readily accommodated within a dynamic system of assembly line production. Even at peak production, Hart-Parr never fully achieved the Fordist model. Hundreds of skilled employees performed the 2,250 machining operatior\s that went into each finished product, while dozens of haulers and laborers performed unskilled tasks by hand. Thus, while Hart-Parr could produce about one hundred tractors per week in 1919, Fordson was producing about twenty-five hundred per week that same year.*' Further, the specialized nature of the farm market and the expense of making the transition from horses made farmers reluctant to embrace the tractor and kept sales volume relatively small.*^ Tractor sales could not support the mass production techniques pioneered in the automobile industry.
By 1917, wartime circumstances and a misplaced emphasis on large and powerful tractors left the company in dire straits. Although a period of prosperity retumed in 1919 and 1920, the agricultural depression, growing labor agitation, and the inherent limitations of the mass production model convinced the company to redirect its efforts fundamentally. Under a new management team, the company found batch production, aggressive marketing, diversification of the product line, and cooperation with related farm machinery businesses to be the only hope for survival. The same company that had focused on productivity during the prewar era of systemization shifted its focus to distribution in an effort to adapt to the changing markets and emerging consumer culture of the 1920s. In brief, this study confirms recent efforts to revise the standard view of American industrialization, with its emphasis on assembly line production, mass marketing, and rigorous control and deskilling of industrial labor.
Since 1930, Charles City's manufacturing history has reflected further trends in the transformation of American industry. The merger with Oliver proved profitable for the company, and it maintained a strong market share through the 1930s while smaller and less integrated firms fell by the wayside. Like other American industries, the Charles City plant reached its peak of productivity in the two decades following World War 11, and a major plant expansion in 1958 signaled Oliver's commitment to the Charles City site. The work force also fared relatively well, particularly as wages rose and working conditior^s improved following the formation of a local of the Urüted Farm Equipment & Metal Workers of America in 1943/Â fter 1960, when the White Motor Company acquired Oliver Farm Equipment and its tractor factory, the Charles City plant became a pawn in several Wall Street maneuvers. The company's sales and profitability continued to grow into the mid-1970s, but began to decline steadily thereafter as just a few firms dominated the American tractor noarket. The plant changed hands several times since 1980, when the White Motor Corporation filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. As the factory's subsequent owners sought to consolidate manufacturing operations within their ever larger corporate structures, a commensurate decline in the Charles City work force ensued. In the mid-1980s, the plant's managers garnered national attention once again, this time for its efforts to terminate health benefits for retirees. The last tractor rolled off the line in Charles City in 1988, and the plant closed its doors forever in 1993."
The rise and fall of tractor manufacturing in Charles City illustrates the complexity, variety, and indeterminacy of the American industrial past. Many histories of business and technology focus on stories of inspired innovation and successful management, implying that firms that mastered shop floor efficiency, marketing creativity, and effective labor control were bound to succeed over less enterprising rivals. But the history of Hart-Parr and its successor corporations demonstrates that triumph was not inevitable for such firms. Despite Hart-Parr's notoriety and profitability early in the century, the approach based on maximizing labor and manufacturing efficiency failed in the midst of World War One. In the 1920s the new management adopted alternate strategies, such as diversifying product lines, intensifying advertising, and moderating the production process. Such maneuvers sustained the company through hard economic times, leaving the firm well positioned to benefit from the consolidation trends that swept the industry in the late 1920s. Subsequent manufacturing and marketing decisions kept the company afioat for another six decades, making it one of the last survivors of the long retrenchment in the farm equipment sector. In the end, however, fiscal concerns of corporate capitalism overwhelmed the plant and its ability to compete in a postindustrial society. As a cor\sequence, Charles City, Iowa, birthplace of the farm tractor, will produce tractors no more. 
